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The  present  report  has  been  prepared  by  a  group  of  independent 
economists  for  the  Centre  for  European  Policy Studies  under  a 
programme  of  research  which  is  receiving financial  support  from 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  The  objective of 
this  programme  is  to  stimulate analysis  and  debate  of  economic 
policy issues  at  the  Level  of  the  European  Communities. 
The  views  expressed  in  the  report  represent  exclusively the  . 
position of  the  authors,  and  do  not  necessarily correspond  with 
those  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  or  the 
Centre  for  European  Policy Studies. 
The  authors  are  indebted  to  B.  Connolly  for  his  valuable  suggestions 
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ABSTRACT 
The  overriding facts  of  1983  are a  worldwide  depression  of  economic 
activity,  a  policy apathy  and  a  hope  that  a  U.S.  economic  upswing  can 
solve  Europe's  problems  of  recovery.  In  the  meantime  often  unwarranted 
fiscal  conservatism  stands  in  the  way  and  a  beggar-thy-neighbor  atmosphere 
has  taken  the  place  of  cooperative policies. 
Tight  monetary  policy and  the  resulting deep  recession  were  a 
matter  of  conscious  policy choice  in  the  U.S.  The  policy has  been 
splendidly successful  in  breaking the  inflation process  not  counting, 
of  course,  the  vast  cost  of  unemployment.  In  Europe  the  tight  money  policy 
has  been  matched  and,  at  the  same  time,  real  full-employment  fiscal 
surpluses  have  been  growing.  Unemployment  is at  levels  not  seen  for  half 
a  century  and,  unlike  in  the  U.S.,  there  is  little prospect  for  growth. 
Signs  of  "spontaneous  forces  of  recovery"  are  sparse. 
Policy discussion  centers  on  two  areas.  One  is  the  question 
whether  cuts  in  real  wages  are  an  essential  step toward  a  high-employment 
economy.  The  other  is whether  with  current  large  budget  deficits there 
is any  room  at  all  for  fiscal  initiatives to  help  bring  about  a  recovery. 
In  that  context,  of  course,  the ·question  of  monetary  accommodation  arises. 
Should  monetary  policy be  set  on  automatic  pilot, following  a  quantitative 
rule,  or  should policy be  switched  toward  more  flexibility,  for  example 
with  a  nominal  income  target  or outright  management  of  money  ? 
Our  report  discusses  the  role  of  real  wages  in  the  context  of  the 
unemployment  problem.  We  conclude  that  there  is  no  evidence  that 
unemployment  is all  and  without  exception,  or even  predominantly,  a  real 
wage  problem.  There  are  good  reasons  to believe that  a  part  of  current 
unemployment  rates  is the  outcome  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  pursued 
in  the  fight  to  stop acceleration of  inflation.  Accordingly  we  also 
conclude  that  real  wage  cuts  would  not  be  the  appropriate  centerpiece of 
policy action.  On  the  contrary,  the  centerpiece  must  be  an  expansion  of 
aggregate  demand  accompanied  by  incomes  policies that  render  more 
favorable  the  trade off  between  recovery and  disinflation. - ii  -
We  place  great  emphasis  on  the  need  for  a  coordinated expansion. 
A coordinated expansion  reduces  the  costs  in  terms  of  budget  deficits  and 
external  imbalances  for  the  participating countries  while  raising the 
extent  of  expansion.  But  the  advantages  of  a  coordinated expansion  must  be 
considered  in  the  light  of  fiscal  difficulties that  governments  are 
experiencing or, at  least, perceiving.  Governments  see  a  trade off  between 
financial  stability  (or  the  size  and  scope  of  government  in  the  economy), 
and  fiscal  expansion.  We  consider  that,question and  present  data  for 
full-employment  real  budget  deficits.  There  is  little doubt  that  Germany 
and  the  U.K.,  for  example,  cannot  plead financi.al  obstacles  to  expansion. 
Their fiscal  position  is entirely  removed  from  the possibility of  such 
difficulties.  In other  countries,  Denmark  for  example,  the  budget  problem 
is  so  striking that  one  can  hardly  recommend  a  major,  sustained expansion 
of  the  budget  deficit.  Recognizing  the  fiscal  difficulties  and  priorities 
we  argue  for  an  expansion  program  centered  on  a  transitory stimulus,  helping 
to  get  the  recovery  underway.  We  also  point  out  that  in  a  coordinated 
expansion  weak  currency  countries  can  do  their part  with  a  minor  expansion 
so  as  to  leave  their external  balance  or their budget  deficit  unchanged, 
thus  neither  promoting  nor  retarding  the  EC  wide  expansion. CONTENTS 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
The  overriding macroeconomic  facts of 1982-83  are a  worldwide 
depression  of  economic  activity, only  weak  signs  of  an  economic  recovery, 
and  continuing misalignments  in  exchange  rates.  There  is widespread 
scepticism about  conventional  fiscal-monetary  stimuli,  and  little considera-
tion of  coordinated policies across  countries.  On  the  contrary,  tighter 
fiscal  policy is  being  pursued  in  several  countries  and  signs  of  beggar-thy-
neighbor  policies  and  protectionism are  every day  more  evident. 
It  is fairly easy  to pinpoint  at  least  the  proximate  cause  for  the 
lasting  recession  and  the  dim  prospects  for  recovery.  Overly  accommodative 
policies  in  the  past,  in  the  face  of oil  shocks  and  reduced  productivity 
growth,  had  led to  sharply  higher  inflation and,  possibly,  postponed  the 
needed  adjustment  in economic  structure.  Deliberate,  contemplated  recession 
policies,  in  the  form  of  monetary  contractions  in the u.s.,  and  matched 
in  Europe,  were  then  used.  They  have  been  strikingly successful  in  cutting 
down  inflation  in  the u.s.  while  containing the  inflation problem  in 
Europe.  They  have,  however,  left  a  legacy of  vast  economic  slack,  a 
deepening  recession  and  the  risk that  the  "spontaneous  forces  of  recovery" 
which  should  come  on  the  scene  about  now,  may  not  make  their appearance 
in  time.  At  the  same  time  European  inflation  remains  uncomfortably  high 
and  stands  in  the  way  of  an  unconsidered expansion. 
It  is  now  anticipated that  in early 1983  recovery  should  get 
underway,  primarily originating  in  the  U.S.  and  in  Japan  but  with 
continuing  weakness  in  Europe,  especially in  key  countries  like Germany. 
But,  as  Table  1  shows,  the  strength of  the  recovery  is exceptionally weak. 
The  recovery  is  weak  by  comparison  with  the  average  growth  rate of  the  1970s 
and,  more  strikingly,  by  comparison  with  the  recovery  from  the  world-wide 
1975  recession  as  shown  by  the  1976-78  average  growth  rates. 
Not  only are  the  growth  prospects  offered in Table  1  very 
pessimistic,  they  may  still turn  out  to overstate  the  outcome  for  a  number 
of  reasons.  While  US  recovery  is  under  way,  it has  not  yet  started in  the -4-
EEC.  More  important  ,  debt  and  payments  problems  of  third world  countries 
imply  important  losses  of  export  markets.  Finally spreading  bankruptcy  and 
uncertainty about  interest  rates  and  demand  prospects  leave  many  firms 
unwilling to  expand  capacity or  inventories,  facing  the  risk of  having  to 
carry them  at  high  costs  or  liquidate at  loss  should  the  general  recovery 
not  take  place.  For  these  reasons,  and  because  recovery  is  not  yet  in  sight, 
many  believe  that  a  zero  growth  prospect--or even  less--for the  EC  in  1983 
is  very plausible. 
Table  1  Growth  Prospects  for Industrialized Countries 
1970-80  1976-78  1981  1982  1983 
Average  Recovery 
All  OECD  countries  3.3  4.2  1.2  -o.5  1.5 
EC  3.2  3.5  -0.4  0.2  0.4 
Source  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  December  1982,and  EC. 
Major  misalignments  of  exchange  rates, aside  from  growth,  represent 
an  important  policy issue.  The  yen  is  widely  beli~ved to  be  undervalued 
and  the  pound  and  dollar  to  be  overvalued,  even  taking  into account  recent 
adjustments.  The  excessive  competitiveness  of  Japan  is  leading  to  nasty 
protectionist  moves  in  Europe  and  the  U.S.;  the overvaluation of  sterling 
coincides  with  catastrophic  Levels  of  unemployment  in  the  U.K.  Figure  1 
shows  relative  costs  in  manufacturing  in  several  countries  in  December 
of  1982  compared  to  the  average  of  1975-80.  It  makes  clear  that  Japan  on  one 
side  and  the  U.K.  and  U.S.  on  the  other  have  a  competitive  position entirely 
out  of  Line  with  Long  term  averages. 
Exchange  rate  misalignments  with  their  implications  for  competiti-
veness  are  an  important  part  of  today's  policy malaise.  Although  the 
depression  is  world-wide,  some  countries  may  see  their situation as  coming 
from  overvaluation  and  be  tempted  by  competitive depreciations.  From  the 
world  point  of  view,  rounds  of  competitive depreciations  are,  however, 
not  the  ~~lution;  they divert  attention  from  the  priority of  reviving Figure  1 
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world  demand.  This  is an  important  consideration  because,  should  the  slack 
deepen,  peripheral  countries  (Sweden,  Australia,  Greece)  and  increasingly 
the  centers  will  turn  to exchange  rate  policies  to  Look  after their  own 
interest. 
Against  this  background,  the  Commission  of  the  European  Community 
has,  in its Annual  Economic  Report  1982-83,  addressed the  policy options 
for  Europe  in  the  present  year.  Although  it emphasizes  the difficulties 
associated with  policy and  the  need  for  caution,  the  Commission  gives  a 
qualified endorsement  to  two  controversial  propositions  : 
1.  The  need  to  contain or  even  reverse  real  wage  growth,  which  is 
judged to  have  been  excessive  in  the  past  ten  years.  This  is 
part  of  a  strong emphasis  on  the  macroeconomic  supply side  and 
part  of  a  package  which  includes  supply  side fiscal  policies. 
2.  The  use,  on  the  demand  side,  of  nominal  income  targeting as  a 
financial  policy setting. 
In  this report,  we  shall  address  the  same  issues.  We  discuss 
whether  real  wage  growth  has  indeed been  too  high  and  whether  nominal 
income  targeting is, at this stage,  a  suitable financial  framework.  We  then 
argue  that  the  recovery  package  must  include  a  direct  fiscal  expansion 
targeted at  investment  and  employment  and  coordinated among  the  major 
European  countries.  Of  course  such  recommendations  must  be  judged  in  the 
context  of  already existing fiscal  deficits  and  the  serious  risk of 
reigniting inflationary pressures  even  as  inflation is starting to 
decelerate  from  its current  high  level. 
II  REAL  WAGES  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The  thesis that  European  unemployment  is, in  good  part, not  due  to 
cyclical factors  but  rather  to excessively high  real  wages  is  rece1v1ng  wide 
support.  This  possibility has  been  studied by  the  Commission  1  and  has 
1  "Real  Wages  and  Employment",  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
July 1982. -7-
been  recently advanced  in  a  particularly forceful  manner  by  Giersch  2 
"  What  should  then  be  the  therapy  ?  A wage  pause  would  be 
good;  but  half  a  year  is  not  enough,  especially if there  might  be 
catch  up  effects.  Thus,  the  longer  the better until  unemployment 
declines  to  a  more  acceptable  level ••• 
After  these  undistorted wage-price  relations  free  forces  on 
the  supply  side, it is quite  clear  where  demand  will  come  from  : 
from  the  purchasing power  that  the  central  bank  can  create through 
monetary  expansion  when  potential  output  (supply)  is  readily 
available.  Without  restrictions on  the  wage  front,  aggregate 
demand  expansion  through  monetary  policy can  bring  little more 
than  inflation". 
The  view  that  unemployment  is a  problem  of  the  level  of  real  wages, 
not  of  the  cyclical  downturn  in  demand,is  a  sharp challenge  to Keynesian 
macroeconomics  that  interprets the  world-wide  increase  in  unemployment 
rates  as  produced  by  recession.  In  the  Keynesian  view  recovery of  demand 
through  monetary  and  fiscal  policy will  revive  employment,  while  in  the 
perspective of  excessive  real  wages  such  policies  will  merely  rekindle 
inflationary pressures.  As  a  preliminary to  policy analysis it is therefore 
essential  to  sort  out  in  more  detail  these  two  hypotheses. 
Figure  2  helps  explain  the  two  positions  3•  On  the  axis  we  show  the 
real  wage  (understood  as  the  wage  deflated by  the  prices  of  output  produced 
in  the  economy)  and  real  aggregate  demand.  The  schedule  FF  shows  combina-
tions  of  real  wages  and  real  aggregate  demand  such  that  firms  are  willing 
to  supply  an  amount  of  output  equal  to the  level  demanded.  The  schedule 
is downward  sloping to  show  that  high  levels of output,  on  the  supply  side, 
will  only  be  produced  if  real  wages  decline  thus  making  it profitable for 
firms  to expand  employment  and  production.  It is drawn  for  given  technology 
and  a  given  capital  stock.  The  schedule  Y*  shows  the  full  employment  level 
2  "Kaufkraft  und  Lohne",  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  Auszuge  aus  Presseartikeln, 
November  6,  1982  (translated).  See  also  the  discussion of J.  Roth,  "Mehr 
Beschaftigung durch  Reallohnzuruckhaltung", Kieler  Diskussionsbeitrage, 
March  1982.  Roth  concludes  that  a  1%  cut  ;n real  wages  generates 
400,000  jobs  in  Germany.  In  terms  of  that  analysis  a  5%  cut  in  real 
wages  would  restore  full-employment. 
3  This  figure  is adapted from  the early disequilibrium model  of 
R.  Mundell,  "Some  Subtleties  in  the  Interpretation of  Keynesian 
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of  demand.  Points  to  the  Left  of  FF  represent  Levels  of  demand  below  the 
competitive  supply  firms  are  willing to  bring  to  the  market  at  each  Level 
of  real  wages.  These  points  thus  correspond to  Keynesian  unemployment.  By 
contrast,  points  to  the  Left  of  Y*,  the  full  employment  Level  of  demand, 
but  on  or  to  the  right  of  FF,  correspond to  high-real-wage  or  classical 
unemployment. 
The  full  employment  equilibrium is at  pointE with  a  real  wage  W*. 
At  a  higher  wage  W'  theri will  be  ~nemployment, but  that  unemployment  may 
be  classical, as  at  point  A,or  Keynesian,  as  at  point  B.  If point  B were 
the  position of  the  economy,demand  expansion  could  go  some  way  toward  solving 
the  unemployment  problem,  though  not  all the  way.  At  given  real  wages, 
demand  expansion  can  move  the  economy  to point  A,  but  no  farther.  If,however, 
the  economy  is already at  point  A,  the  scope  for  demand  expansion  to  raise 
employment  may  be  very  Limited.  At  one  extreme,  with  rigidly fixed  real 
wages  there  is absolutely nu  scope  for  expansion  in  employment.  Any 
increase  in  demand,  given  the  output  Level  supplied at  the  going  real  wage, 
will  raise prices.  The  incipient  decline  in  real  wages  and  the  resulting 
expansion  in  labor  demand  ~ead then  to  an  immediate  rise  in  wages  that 
frustrates the expansion  of  employment  and  output.  Thus  with  completely 
rigid  real  wages  demand  expansion  is purely inflationary. 
Of  course,  this  scenario overstates  the  speed  with  which  wages 
respond  to prices.  A more  reasonable  description  will  claim that  demand 
expansion,  at  a  point  like  A,  can  only  secure  transitory gains  in 
employment.  In this view  the  increase  inodemand,  by  raising the price of 
a  given  output  supply,  Leads  to a  fall  in  real  wages.  Firms  respond  to 
reduced  real  labor-costs  by  increasing employment  and  output.  Thus  the 
economy  moves  down  the  FF  schedule  toward  full-employment  equilibrium. 
Whether  such  an  expansion  can  be  sustained for  any  Length  of  time  depends 
on  the  speed  with  which  money  wages  react  to  the  decline  in  real  wages. 
If  wages  are  sluggish  the  expansion  is  relatively durable.  In  the extreme, 
if money  wages  are  sticky,  the  expansion  can  be  Lasting.  Thus  even  in  the 
case  of  classical  unemployment  there  is  room  for  demand  expansion  to exert 
expansionary effects on  employment,  although  these effects  come  about 
only  by  eroding  real  wages  through  increased inflation. -10-
Figure  2  focusses  on  the  aggregate  economy,  not  making  sectoral 
distinctions.  Of  course,  it is  important  to  recognize  that  there  may  well 
be  sharp differences  between  sectors.  Some  industries  may  well  be  in  full 
equilibrium with  firms  selling all  the  output  they  wish  to  produce,  while 
other  industries  because  of  import  competition  or  for  cyclical  reasons  face 
a  shortage  of  demand.  Focussing  on  aggregate  unemployment  rates  conceals 
these  sectoral  differences  and  may  lead to  unforeseen  bottlenecks  and 
inflationary pressures  in  an  expansion. 
Table  2  shows  the  increase  in  unemployment  rates  in  the  EC  and 
separately,  in  the  U.K.  and  in  Germany.  The  unemployment  rates  for  the 
past  two  years  are  compared  with  the  average  of  1975-80.  In  each  case 
there  is  a  significant  rise  in  unemployment  and  the  question arises 
Table  2  Unemployment  Rates 
(%  of  civilian  labor  force) 
1970-74  1975-80  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Average  Average 
EC9  2.5  5.3  5.5  6.2  8.1  9.4 
U.K.  2.8  5.5  5.3  6.9  10.6  12.2 
Germany  1.1  3.8  3.4  3.4  4.8  6.9 
Source  :  European  Economy,  November  1982. 
whether  increased  real  wages,  or  a  failure  of  product  wages  to fall  in  the 
face  of  increased  real  costs  of  imported  inputs,  are  the  chief  source of 
the  poor  performance.  Once  more,  returning  to  Figure  2,  we  wish  to  know 
whether  the  economy  is at  point  C,  or  whether  at  point  B or  A.  The 
diagnosis  is essential  for  any  sensible  policy advice. 
Labor  Shares  and  Wage  Gaps 
It  would'be  convenient  if a  simple  statistic could be  produced  that 
allowed the diagnosis of unemployment,  determining  whether  it is a  cyclical - ll-
problem,  a  real  wage  problem  or  both.  The  concept  of  the  real  wage  gap  is 
meant  to fill that  function  and  has  been  adopted  for  that  purpose  by  the  EC 
and  the  OECD.  We  are  very  doubtful  of  the  usefulness  of  this statistic. 
We  now  comment  on  the  reasons  for  our  scepticism. 
The  main  two  measures  that  have  been  used  as  evidence  of 
excessively  high  real  wages  are  the  labor  share  in value  added  and  the 
real  wage  gap. 
Conceptually,  they  measure  exactly the  same  thing  :  the  real  wage 
gap  measures  the deviation of  the  labor  share  from  some  reference value. 
They  may  differ empirically,  because  of  data  used  in their construction 4 
The  labor  share  is  given  by  : 
where  W,  Pc  and  Pv  are  the  nominal  wage,  the  consumer  price deflator  and 
the  value-added deflator,  respectively.  L is  labour  and  V value  added. 
The  labour  share'will  increase, or, equivalently,  the  real  wage 
gap  will  be  positive if either the  real  wage  in  terms  of  the  consumer  price 
deflator  increases,  the  consumer  price deflator  increases  compared  to the 
value  added  deflator, or  labor  productivity decreases. 
Suppose  now  that  the  real  wage  gap  measure  showed  an  increase 
what  can  be  inferred about  the  real  wage  level  ?  The  answer  comes  from 
production  theory and  it turns  out  to  be  disappointing  :  if there  were 
only two  factors  of  production,  capital  and  labor,  then  the  competitive 
share  of  labor  in  value  added  would  move  in  the  same  direction as  the  real 
wage  (product  wage)  when  the elasticity of  substitution between  factors  is 
less  than  unity.  Higher  real  wages  mean  then  a  higher  share  of  labor 
4  Another  difference  between  the  two  is due  to the  approximation  of 
<PciPv>  by  the  terms  of  trade  CP*/Pv>·  If P*  is the  price of  imports 
and  a  the  share  of  imports  in  consumption,  then  :  <Pc/P  = 
(p1-ap*8Jp  )  = (P*/P  )a  v  v  v  v  • -12-
in income.  But  if the elasticity of  substitution were  larger than  unity 
the  converse  would  occur- as  real  wages  rise  high  substitutability implies 
a  decline  in  labor's  share.  Finally,  in  the  borderline  case of  unitary 
elasticity of  substitution, or  Cobb  Douglas  technology,  shares  are 
.  .  .  l  5  1nvar1ant  to  movements  1n  rea  wages 
After  an  unwarranted  increase  in  real  wages,  firms  initially have 
little scope  for  substitution.  They  have  no  other  choice  than  to  pay  these 
higher  wages  or  go  bankrupt.  The  labor  income  share  increases.  Examination  of 
real  wage  gaps  correctly indicates  that  real  wages  are  too  high.  If at  the  same 
time  output  declines,  the  usual  procyclical  movement  of  labor productivity  leads 
to  a  larger decline  in output  than  in employment.  This  leads  to  an  even  larger  real 
wage  gap.  As  time  passes,however,firms  can  change  the  factor  composition  of 
production  and  they shift  to  less  labor-intensive  technology.  Labor  productivity 
slowly  rises  and  as  a  result  the  real  wage  gap  disappears.  In  the  long  run,  after 
firms  have  modified  their capital  stock,  and  with  enough  substitution between 
factors,  the  real  wage  gap  may  well  be  negative.  But  the  real  wage  problem  is still 
very much  there;  it does  not  appear  as  a  gap  Merely  because  of  the  massive  decline 
in  employment  and  the  resulting  increase  in  labor productivity.  Lest  the  reader 
conclude  that  the  real  wage  gap  Measure  always  understates the real  wage  problem, 
consider  the  opposite  case  where  real  wages  are  too  low  :  this  may  lead over 
time  to  a  positive  real  wage  gap. 
Further  doubts  about  the  usefulness  of  the  measure  are  raised by  looking 
at  the  real  wage  gap  across  countries,  as  in  Table  3.  Inside  the  EC,  real  wage 
gaps  vary  substantially across  countries,  but  with  little relation to their 
employment  experience.  Furthermore--this  is already emphasized  in  the  EC  report--
the  gap  index  for  Japan  stands  at  112.  But  it is  surely not  the  case  that  Japan 
has  a  sense  that  its  labor  is overpriced or employment  expansion  has  been  small. 
To  summarize,  labor  shares  and  real  wage  gaps  are  not  useful  in 
determining  the  existence and  the  size of  a  wage  problem.  The  issue of 
measuring  the  real  wage  gap  and  its  relevance  to determining  whether  real 
wages  are  excessive  is  further  explored  in  Appendix  2. 
5  One  cost  component  increased significantly during this period,  the  real 
interest  rate.  In  the  short  run,  this  has  substantially increased carrying 
costs  on  working  capital  and  inventories,  acting  like  any  other factor 
price  increase  to decrease  employment.  In  the  long  run,  it  leads  to  a 
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Real  Wage  Gaps  and  Employment  in  1982 
(Whole  Economy) 
Real  Wage  Gap  Cumulative  Percentage  Change 
1973  =  100  Employment  :  1973-82 
112.1  -4.1 
95.9  -5.1 
108.7  2.5 
105.5  6.4 
96.3  -0.8 
100.8  -6.8 
103.2  -1.3 
112.4  7.7 
Is  there  a  Real  Wage  Problem  ? 
in 
Given  the  increase  in  the  price of  materials  and  intermediate  inputs 
since  1973,  is  the  real  wage  too  high  for  full  employment  ?  In  terms  of 
Figure  2,  is  W'  above  W*  ?  If this  is  the  case,  is  then  the  low  level  of 
employment  due  mainly  to  the  real  wage  or due  to  a  very  low  Level  of 
aggregate  demand  ?  Are  we  at  A or  at  B ?  If the  real  wage  gap  is not  a 
suitable  measure  of  real  wage  problems  is  there  an  alternative approach  to 
disentangling classical  and  Keynesian  unemployment  ?  The  only  way  to  answer 
these  questions  is  to  use  a  production  function  and  solve  for  the  relevant 
demand  functions  or  competitive,  equilibrium employment  Levels.  Unfortunately, 
as  we  will  see,  no  unambiguous  answer  comes  from  this  approach  either. 
Suppose  that  firms  were  not  constrained  in  their sales.  The 
equilibrium employment  level  would  then  only depend  on  the existing capital 
stock,  real  material  prices, and  product  wages.  Changes  in  employment  over 
time  would  depend  on  changes  in  these  determinants.  With  estimates  of  a 
production  function  and  the  given  changes  in  capital  and  real  material  prices 
we  can  ask  the  following  question  :  what  change  in  real  wages  is compatible -14-
with  a  specified growth  in  employment  ?  It turns  out  that  the  answer,  not 
surprisingly,  depends  on  trend productivity growth.  Table  4  shows  a 
calculation  for  the  U.K.  that  helps  make  the  point, details  being  shown  in 
Appendix  3.  The  U.K.  labor  force  over  the  period 1972-80  grew  cumulatively 
by  4.1  %.  Suppose  we  looked  for  growth  in  manufacturing  employment  equal 
to  labor  force  growth.  As  a  benchmark,  then,  we  would  keep  the  fraction 
of  the  labor  force  employed  in  manufacturing  constant. 
Table  4 
Actual 
Employment  Wages 
-17%  16% 
Growth  in  Employment  and  Product  Wages 
(cumulative  % changes) 
UK  1972-80 
Wage  Growth  Compatible  with  4.1  % Employment  Growth 
when  Productivity Growth  is 
12.6%  8.3%  4.1% 
13.6%  3.4%  -7.6% 
Note  For  calculation  see  Appendix  3. 
Actual  real  wages  grew  by  16%  and  employment  declined  by  17%.  But 
how  much  could  real  wages  have  grown,  given  the  behaviour  of  the  capital 
stock  and  real  material  prices  ?  The  Table  shows  that  with  a  1.5%  growth 
per  year  in  total  factor  productivity  (12.6%  cumulatively)  real  wage  growth 
could  have  been  nearly  14%,  while  still  leaving  room  for  employment  growth. 
But  the  sensitivity to productivity growth  is apparent  by  looking at  the 
wage  numbers  consistent  with  1%  and  0.5%  total  productivity growth.  Here 
there  is no  room  for  real  wage  growth  and,  in  the  latter case,  real  wages 
would  actually have  to decline.  The  trend  growth  rate of  total  factor 
productivity  in  the  1960s  was  1%.  If that  rate  was  maintained,  which  is 
an  optimistic  assumption,  it is  clear that  real  wages  actually grew  too 
fast  to  be  consistent  with  employment  growth.  In  other  words,  real  wages 
have  become  too  high  to  secure full  employment.  But  these  numbers  do  not 
tell  us  whether all of  the  decline  in  employment  is due  to excessive  real 
wages. 
The  production  function  approach  developed  in  Table  4  suggests  that 
at  least  part  of  the  decline  in  employment  is easily explained by  real -15-
wage  growth  outpacing  trend productivity at  a  time  of  adverse  supply 
shocks.  But  the  story  seems  to  be  quite different  for  the  Last  two  years 
(1981-82).  In  the  Last  two  years  wage  growth  has  moderated  in  several 
countries  and  material  prices  have  stopped  increasing and,  for  some 
countries,  have  actually declined.  In  these  circumstances,  setting aside 
Lagged  adjustments  to  the earlier  real  wage  increases  that  may  still be 
going  on,  we  would  expect  no  further  decline  in employment.  But  this  has 
not  been  the  case,as  Table  5  shows. 




Wages,  Prices,  Employment  and  Output  in Manufacturing 
(Cumulative  Percentage  Change) 
Product  Wage  Real  Material  Price  Employment 
-1.9  -9.5  -5.7 
6.4  -5.9  -5.6 






Note  The  product  wage  is  calculated hourly earnings  in  manufacturing 
deflated by  the  producer  price  index  for  manufactures.  For  France 
the  wage  is deflated by  the  price  index  of  industrial  output.  The  real 
material  price  is  the  IMF  US  dollar  index  for all  commodities, 
converted  into national  currency and  deflated by  the  manufactures 
price  index.  Employment  refers  to manufacturing.  The  1982  observation 
for  manufacturing  prices, output,  and  employment  is the  average  of 
the  second  and  third quarters. 
Source  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators,  December  1982,  Economic  Outlook, 
December  1982,and  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics,  February 
1983. 
In  Table  5  we  report  changes  in product  wages,  real  commodity 
prices  and  employment  in  manufacturing  for  Germany,  France  and  the  U.K. 
The  most  interesting case  is that  of  Germany,where  product  wages  declined, 
real  material  prices  declined sharply and  yet  employment  contracted very 
significantly.  This  is certainly a  very  strong  indication of  a  demand  -
induced  decline  in employment.  The  cases  of  the  U.K.  and  France  appear  more 
ambiguous  because  product  wages  actually grew.  But  here,  too,there  was  a 
strong offset  from  real  material  prices  and,  of  course,  the  Table  does  not -16-
yet  make  allowance  for  some  trend productivity growth.  Furthermore,  a 
comparison  of  the  U.K.  and  French  observations  suggests  a  demand  effect 
for  the  U.K. 
What  can  be  concluded  from  the  discussion  of  real  wages  ?  First, 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  argue  that  a  large  part  of  the  unemployment 
developing  in  1975-80  is  not  due  to  a  failure  to adjust  real  wages  to  lower 
productivity growth  and  material  price  shocks.  In  this  sense  demand 
expansion  could  not  be  expected  to  restore  the  unemployment  levels  of  the 
early 1970s  except  by  accelerating inflation.  Equally  important  is  the 
recognition,  supported  by  Table  5,  that  in  the  very  recent  past  real  wages 
and  material  prices  are  not  the  source  of  reduced  employment,  but  that 
recent  increases  in  unemployment  are  due  to  low  demand.  In  this  sense  there 
is  room  for  demand  expansion  to eliminate  some  of  the  unemployment.  In  terms 
of  Figure  2,  then,  the  economy  is at  a  point  like  B. 
The  conclusion  that  some  unemployment  is cyclical,  some  due  to 
~xcessive levels  of  real  wages  is perhaps  a  let-down.  But  it is  worth 
stressing  that  no  evidence  whatsoever  has  been  offered to date  for  the 
claim that  unemployment  is due  to  high  real  wages  only,  as  the  argument 
of  those  favoring  a  "Lohnpause"  (wage-freeze)  would  imply.  At  the  same  time, 
of  course,  the  fact  that  some  unemployment  is  no  doubt  due  to excess  real 
wages  serves  as  a  caution  in  interpreting the  magnitude  of  the  expansion 
and  possible  recovery.  Furthermore,  in  shaping policies  for  higher  employment 
the  composition  of  unemployment--Keynesian  versus  classical--is  relevant. 
This  is particularly the  case  when  a  low  level  of  aggregate  demand  and 
capacity utilization discourages  the  normal  adjustment  to  real  wage  cuts 
through  increased profitability of  capital  formation. 
The  Effects  of  Real  Wage  Cuts 
Suppose,  then,  that  measures  were  undertaken  to  reduce  real  wages. 
The  effects  would  be  very different,  depending  on  whether  there  is 
classical or  Keynesian  unemployment. 
In  Keynesian  unemployment,  the effects on  domestic  demand  are 
likely to  be  ambiguous  at  best.Redistribution of  income  toward  profit  may -17-
avoid  bankruptcies  but  is  unlikely to  increase  consumption  or  investment 
demand.  A cut  in  real  wages  may  however,  be  translated through  depreciation 
into a  gain  in external  competitiveness,  Leading  to  increased  world  demand 
for  domestic  goods  and  to  higher  production  and  employment.  Employment 
expansion  through  increased  competitiveness  is obviously at  the  expense 
of  other  countries.  If the  EC  as  a  whole  follows  such  a  strategy, it must 
be  at  the  expense  of  the  u.s.  and  Japan.  These  countries  are  Likely  to 
take  counter  measures,  either through  exchange  rates,  protectionism or 
parallel  real  wage  cuts.  The  experience  of  the  1930's  suggests  that  such 
competitive  wage  cutting is unlikely to  succeed. 
In  classical  unemployment,  the  real  wage  is  the  problem.  Reducing 
real  wages  leads  ffrms  to  want  to  supply and  employ  more.  Where  does  the 
demand  for  the  increased output  come  from  ?  If demand  was  rationed to start 
with,  there  will  be  no  problem,but  this possibility appears  unlikely. 
Demand  may  come  instead from  an  increase  in  investment.  If firms  believe 
they  can  sell  the  increased output,  they  will  decide not  only to  employ  more 
Labor  but  also  to  increase capital,  thus  increasing  investment  demand  and 
validating their initial beliefs of  higher  demand.  The  bootstrap flavor 
of  this  argument  suggests  that  such  a  demand  expansion  should  not  be  relied 
upon  too  strongly.  Real  wage  cuts  must,  even  under  classical  unemployment, 
be  accompanied  by  an accommodating  fiscal  or  monetary  expansion.  This, 
indeed,  is  recognized  in  the  quote  by  Giersch  above. 
We  conclude  then  that  any  real  wage  cuts  that  are part  of  a 
stabilization program  are  in  themselves  insufficient  to  guarantee  recovery 
and  stability.  There  needs  to  be  a  complementary expansion in demand  6 
6  The  discussion  here  has  focussed  on 
11the
11  wage.  But  many  of  the 
problems  in  the  Labor  market  may  well  arise  from  an  insufficiently 
flexible  relative  wage  structure.  If there  are  some  markets  with 
excess  demand  or classical  unemployment  and  others  with  Keynesian 
unemployment,generalized  wage  cutting will  not  be  the  answer.  There 
is  need  for  a  mix  of  aggregate  demand  policy,  perhaps  some  economy-
wide  real  wage  cuts  or equivalent  fiscal  policies  that  reduce  the 
marginal  cost  of  labor,  and  finally  changes  in  the  relative  wage 
structure.  Relative-wage-flexing ties  in  with  issues  of  indexation. 
Should  social  policy be  implemented  in  the  labor  market,  raising the 
marginal  cost  of  labor  for  the  sake  of equality, or  should  that  be 
a  matter of  fiscal  policy  ?  We  do  not  address  that  question  here 
but  indicate it as  a  crucial  medium-term  problem. -18-
III  NOMINAL  INCOME  RULES 
In  the  Last  ten  years  macroeconomics  has  come  to an  ambivalent 
reassessment  of  monetary  rules.  The  enthusiasm for  fine  tuning,  without 
explicit  restraints  on  accommodation  through  monetary  and  fiscal 
policy,is  widely  recognized  to  be  part  of  the  problems  of  adjustment  to 
recent  oil  shocks.  Not  only  did it  Lead  to  higher  inflation, but,it  is 
often  argued,  by  introducing uncertainty about  policy  it may  have  done 
Little  good  even  to  employment  and  output. 
As  a  result,  and  under  the  guise  of  monetary  rules,  a  sharp 
reduction  in  money  growth  was  engineered  in  several  countries,  Leading 
to  substantial disinflation and  deflation.  Unemployment  rates  now  average 
more  than  inflation  rates  in  industrialized countries  as  shown  in 
Figure  3.  Inflation  remains  high  but  appears  on  the  retreat.  The  question 
then  appears  which  nominal  target  to  adopt  in  the  transition  to  a  Less 
inflationary economy. 
The  instability of  money  demand,  due  to  financial  innovations, 
changes  in  the  menu  of  alternative assets  and  so  on  has  made  monetary 
management  very difficult.  In  such  an  environment  strict money-growth 
rules  are  not  Likely  to  perform  well.  Innovations  which  reduce  money 
demand  make  a  given  money-growth  rule  more  expansionary  and  inflationary 
than  was  intended.  Conversely  a  fall  in velocity is  contractionary.  This  is 
where  nominal  income  rules  come  in.  Given  the  quantity  theory  identity, 
we  can  think of  these  rules  as  velocity-adjusted money  growth  rules  7 
7  Henry  Simons,  in  advancing  the  not1vn  of  a  monetary  rule  in  1936 
argued  :  " •••  it is  clear  enough  and  reasonable  enough  to provide  the 
basis  for  a  new  religion of  money,  a~ound which  might  be  regimented 
strong sentiment  against  tinkering  with  the  currency".  But  he  immedia-
tely continued,"With all its merits,  however,  this  rule  cannot  now  be 
recommended  as  a  basis  for  monetary  reform.  The  obvious  weakness  of 
fixed  quantity,  as  a  sole  rule  of  monetary  policy,  Lies  in  the  danger 
of  sharp  changes  on  the velocity side  ••• ". See  H.C.  Simons  "Rules 
Versus  Authority  in  Monetary  Policy".  Reprinted  in  F.  Lutz  and 
L.  Mints,Readings  in  Monetary  Theory,  Richard  D.  Irwin,  Inc.,  1951, 
p.  341. -19-
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How  does  a  velocity-adjusted  rule  perform  compared  to  a  simple 
money  rule  ?  It does  well  against  autonomous  movements  in velocity  : 
autonomous  decreases  in  money  demand--disturbances  in  the  money  demand 
equation--are  accommodated  by  decreases  in  supply,  with  no  effect  on 
nominal  and  real  income.  It  also does  well  in  protecting real  income  from 
disturbances  in  aggregate  demand.  A decrease  in  aggregate  demand  which 
would  decrease  real  income,  inflation and  velocity  leads  to an  increase 
in  money  until  real  income  and  prices  are  back  to  normal.  By  the  same  token, 
if the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  i$  deliberate,  the  result  of  fiscal 
expansion  for  example,  nominal  income  targets  must  be  increased for  output 
expansion  to  take  place.  Thus,  for  both  velocity and  demand  shocks,  a 
nominal  income  rule  dominates  a  money  rule.  (The  algebra  underlying  these 
arguments  is  given  in  Appendix  4). 
Both  rules  are,  however,  likely to do  badly  in  the  presence  of 
supply  shocks.  The  traditional  approach  to  monetary  policy is  to  consider 
the  two  components  of  nominal  income  growth,  inflation and  growth  separately 
and  to aim  for  the  best  feasible  mix.  Nominal  income  targeting shifts 
decision  on  how  to split  nominal  income  growth  to  firms  and  workers. 
Unfortunately,  as  the  recent  U.K.  experience  has  shown,  the  lack  of 
synchronization  and  coordination  of  price and  wage  decisions,  and  the 
the 
numerous  game  aspects  of  price  and  wage  setting prevent  any  group  from  being in 
a  position to  take  such  a  rational  "decision". 
Unemployment  turns  out  to  be  in  fact  the  tool  used  to  control 
inflation.  The  division of  nominal  income  growth  between  real  growth  and 
inflation depends  on  the  unemployment  sensitivity of  inflation,  which  has 
no  particular optimality propoerty.  Both  rules  share  this characteristic 
and  the  nominal  income  rule  does  not  obviously dominate  the other. 
When  we  turn  to  implementation,  there  is  a  •ajor difference between 
the  two  rules.  It  is already a  non-trivial  task  to  adhere  to  a  money  rule; 
it is an  even  more  difficult one  to  achieve  a  nominal  income  target.  There 
is  overwhelming  evidence  that, over  a  period of  a  few  months,  and  except 
through  exchange  rate effects on  the  CPI,  growth  and  inflation are 
unaffected  by  current  movements  in  money.  If nominal  income  increases, -21-
a  countervailing decrease  in  money  leads  initially only to  sharp  interest 
rate  adjustments  and  thus  an  opposite  movement  in velocity.  Nominal  income 
adjusts  only over  time.  Nominal  income  targeting is  then  a  feedback  rule  for 
money  which  affects  nominal  income  with  long  and  variable  lags.  Traditional 
issues  in  monetary  policy,  such  as  size and  timing  of  feedback  all  return 
through  the  back  door  and  have  to  be  addressed  before  nominal  income 
targeting  can  be  used. 
But  the  strong argument  for  nominal  income  targeting  comes  from 
another  side.  If disinflation,  which  is  underway,  comes  to  lower  the  general 
level  of  interest  rates,  then  real  money  demand  will  rise or  velocity will 
decline  8•  Under  a  monetary  rule  the  adjustment  in velocity deepens  the 
recession.  By  contrast,under  nominal  income  targeting the fall  in  velocity 
can  be  accommodated  by  transitorily higher  money  growth.  Overall,  a  shift 
from  a  strict  money  rule  to  nominal  income  targeting appears  then  to  be  an 
improvement,  being  a  compromise  with  monetarism.  However,  once  inflation 
and  inflationary expectations  are  under  control, it would  be  better to steer 
the  economy  with  prices  and  output  as  separate objectives,  rather  than  being 
concerned  with  their product.  Neither  monetary  targets  nor  nominal  income 
targets  have  any  justification as  ultimate  objectives  of  economic  policy. 
Nor  do  they  even  offer assurance  of  longrun  price stability. They  are 
intermediate targets  that  can  be  improved  upon  by  directly gearing policies 
to  the  ultimate,  separate, objectives  of  price stability and  high  employment. 
IV  REFLATION,  INFLATION,  and  CROWDING  OUT 
We  have  argued  that  although  the  level  of  real  wages  is quite 
likely too  high  to  allow  a  return to full  employment,  it is  aggregate  demand 
which  is the  proximate  cause  of  the  current  recession  and  should  be  the 
primary  focus  of  policy. 
There  are  obviously very  stringent  restrictions on  the  use  of 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  It  would  be  unwise  to disregard the  progress  made 
8  See  Mundell,  R.,  Monetary  Theory,  Goodyear  Publishing  Company,  1971. -22-
in  containing and  already  Lowering  inflation and  to  advocate  a  major  monetary 
expansion;  we  agree  with  the  Commission  that  nominal  income  targeting might 
be,  for  the  time  being,  a  convenient  framework  for  monetary  policy.  The  scope 
for  fiscal  policy is  also  severely  Limited  at  a  time  of  Large  deficits  :  any 
policy  recommendation  which  would  Lead  to  a  Larger  deficit  has  to deal  with 
issues  of  crowding  out  if debt  finance  is  used,  issues  of  inflation if 
deficits  are  monetized. 
Disinflation  :  On  the  inflation  issue  some  useful  things  can  be  said.  First, 
the  current  enormous  unemployment  Levels  are exerting vigorous  dampening 
effects  on  wages.  As  a  consequence  inflation is  indeed  decelerating.  Moreover, 
on  the  current  course  of  minimal  recovery,  that  deceleration of  inflation would 
continue  and  might  even  speed  up. 
Leaving  aside  supply  shocks,  price  inflation is  governed  by  the  growth 
in  money  wages  relative  to  the  growth  rate of  trend productivity.  The  core  of 
disinflation  is  thus  centered on  the  deceleration of  wage  inflation.  The 
deceleration of  wages,  in  turn  depends  on  the  excess  of  actual  unemployment, 
ut,  rates  over  the  noninflationary  rate  of  unemployment,  ut  : 
Wt  =  Wt_1  - a(ut  - ut)  +  X 
where  x  is a  constant  term. 
There  is  considerable  controversy over  the  precise  value  of  the 
noninflationary unemployment  rate,  ut, i.e. the  rate of  unemployment  at 
which  wage  inflation neither  increases  nor  declines.  Equal  controversy 
surrounds  the  parameter  a  that  translates  unemployment  changes  into  changes 
in  wage  inflation.  A conservative estimate  is  to accept  the  5.5%  1979  Level 
of  EC  unemployment  as  corresponding to ut.  Furthermore,  Letting a  be  equal 
to 0.5  would  imply,with  1982  unemployment  at  9.4%,a  decline  in  the  rate of 
wage  inflation of  about  2  percentage  points.  Using  a  value  of  a =  1  wage 
inflation  in  1982  should  have  declined  by  almost  4  percentage  points  9 
9  In  D.  Grubb,  R.  Jackman  and  R.  Layard,  "Causes· of  the  Current 
Stagflation'',  unpublished  manuscript,  London  School  of  Economics, 
1982,an  estimate of  a  is  reported for  the  EEC.  This  value,  in Table I, 
is 1.17. -23-
On  the other  hand  if the  level  of  u;were  higher,  perhaps  as  high  as  6.5%, 
the  deceleration of  wage  inflation would  have  been  commensurately  reduced. 
In  any  event  the  point  that  is  beyond  controversy is  the  following  : 
~th current  rates  of  unemployment,deceleration  of  wages  is very  substantial 
unless  there  are  strong backward-indexation  features  in  the  economy. 
Second,  should  expansion  of  demand  take  place this  will  quite 
assuredly  interfere  with  rapid,  further deceleration of  inflation.  How  much 
so  depends  on  the  vigor  of  the  expansion  and  on  any  incomes  policies--in 
addition to  nominal  income  targeting--that  accompany  expansionary policies. 
But  it is also fair  to  recognize  that  at  present  inflation is falling  sharply, 
so  that  expansion  and  a  lowering  of  slack  in  the  labor  market  does  not  mean 
sharply  rising inflation.  In  the  best  of  circumstances  it means  that  inflation 
will  only fall  moderately,  but  more  likely it means  that  disinflation will 
come  roughly  to  a  halt.But  there  is  room  for  policy to ensure  that  recovery 
is  not  bought  at  the  price of  more  inflation.  Relevant  proposals  reach  from 
outright  wage  controls  to  the  more  attractive schemes  that  involve fiscal-
10  carrotltax packages  in  which  firms  are  taxed on  above  norm  wage  settlements  • 
Active  incomes  policy  in  the  recovery  process  is essential  in  improving  the 
growth/disinflation trade-off. 
A third point  cgncerns  the  improved  outlook  for  inflation,  in  the 
recovery  process,  that  comes  from  capital  deepening  that  has  taken  place 
and  from  the  better utilization of  scale  economies.  As  aggregate  demand  rises, 
higher  utilization  levels  of  plant  and  equipment  lower  unit  labor  costs  or 
raise productivity.  This  factor  will  certainly operate  to  dampen  the 
inflationary consequences  of  continuing  wage  increases. 
Budget  Deficits  :  Are  current  deficits  such  that  additional  deficit 
financing  would  risk financial  instability and  that  the  increase  in 
interest  rates  would  reduce  aggregate  demand  enough  to offset  the  fiscal 
stimulus  ? 
10  For  details of  such  a  proposal  see  D.  Grubb,  R.  Layard  and 
J. Symons,  "Wages,Unemployment  and  Incomes  Policy".  Unpublished 
manuscript,  London  School  of  Economics,  1982  and  R.  Layard,  "Is 
Incomes  Policy the  Answer  to  Unemployment"  ?  Unpublished  man usc ri pt', 
London  School  of  Economics,  1982. - 23  bis-
The  first  consideration  is  that  deficits  are drastically distorted 
both  by  the  cyclical  position  and  by  inflation.  For  example  the  U.K.  shows 
for  1982  a  general  government  budget  deficit  of  0.9%  of  GOP.  Once  the 
adjustment  for  the  inflation  component  of  nominal  interest  payments  on  debt 
is  made,  the  budget  turns  into a  surplus  of  more  than  2%  of  GOP.  Once  the 
further  adjustment  for  the  cycl·ical  position  is  undertaken,  one  finds  that 
in  the  deepest  recession  in fifty  years,  the  government  runs  a  whopping 
surplus  in  excess  of  6%  of  GOP,  in effect  raising taxes  to  reduce  the  real 
value  of  public  debt  outstanding.  In  other  EC  countries  fiscal  policy 
is  not  as  perversely misdirected,  but  in  each  instance,  once  adjustments 
for  the  inflationary component  of  interest  payments  and  for  the  cyclical 
position are  made,  budget  deficits  look  much  less  startling and  out  of 
line  with  historical  experience  than  the  raw  data  suggest.  Moreover,  there 
is  no  reason,  in  sensible  policy analysis,  ~ot  to  make  these  adjustments. 
Table  6  shows  data  for  actual  government  net  Lending,  and  for  net 
Lending  adjusted for  the  inflation component  of  debt  service  as  well  as  for 
cyclical  factors.  It  is essential  to  note  that  the  inflation-adjusted 
full-employment  budget  not  only  is  in surplus,  but  actually has  been 
increasing.  Indeed,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume,  given  the  Low  inflation 
of  the  1960s,  that  full-employment  surplusses  today are  any  Lower  than 
they  were  in  the  1960s.  In other  words,  correcting cyclically and  making 
allowance  for  inflation the  "budget  problem"  assumes  an  entirely different 
appearance.  Of  course,  one  must  also  recognize  important  Limitations  of  the 
cyclical  and  inflation corrections.  While  the  principle of  these  corrections 
is entirely beyond  controversy the  exact  details  certainly are  not.  In 
that  respect  the  last  column  of  Table  6  is indicative of  the  level,  and  even 
more  so  of  the  trend; it is not  an  uncontestable  number.  These  figures, 
though,  are  vastly more  representative of  budget  trends  than  the actual 
budget  deficit  in  column  (1). -24-
Table  6  EC  General  Government  Net  Lending 
(%  of  GOP) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1 )+(2)+(3) 
Net  Lending  Inflation  Cyclical  Corrected 
Adjustment  Adjustment  Net  Lending 
1961-73  -0.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1973-79  -3.3  2.8  0.6  0.1 
1980  -3.5  4.1  0.5  1 .1 
1981  -4.8  3.9  2.1  1.2 
1982  -5.0  3.5  3.3  1.8 
Note  The  cyclical  correction assumes  that  1973  and  1979  were  high  activity 
years  thus  setting the  benchmark  for  cyclical  adjustment.  The 
inflation adjustment  is specified  in  the  source  for  column  (2). 
Source  Column  (1)  from  Table  46  and  column  (2)  from  Table  6.6 of 
European  Economy,  November  1982.  Column  (3)  calculations  kindly 
provided  by  B.  Connolly. 
The  foregoing  remarks  do  not  recognize  the  important  differences 
between  EC  countries.  In  Table  7  we  further  pursue  the  question  by  Looking 





General  Government  Net  Lending  in  1982 
(%  of  GOP)  . 
Net  Lending  Inflation  Cyclical 
Adjustment  Adjustment 
-3.9  0.8  3.0 
-0.9  3.3  4.1 
-12.9  7.0  3.8 
-9.5  0.4  2.8 
Corrected 





Source  :  Calculations  of  the  authors.  See  also  :  W.H.  Buiter 
11The  proper 
Measurement  of  Government  Budget  Deficits  :  Comprehensive  Wealth 
Accounting  or  Permanent  Income  Accounting  for  the  Public  Sector  : 
Its Implications  for  Policy Evaluation  and  Oesign
11
,  London  School 
of  Economics  Working  Paper. -25-
at  four  different  countries.  Once  again  we  caution  that  the  corrected net 
lending  is only  indicative of  a  corrected budget  figure.  Even  so  the  Table 
reveals  striking contrasts  between  two  extremes,  the  U.K.  with  an 
extraordinary  real  full-employment  budget  surplus,  and  Denmark  with  an 
equally extraordinary  real  full-employment  budget  deficit  11 
A real  full-employment  surplus  of 4,  5  or  6%  has  no  justification 
in  terms  of  macroeconomic  stability. The  argument  that  over  the  business 
cycle  budgets  should  balance  can  be  accepted  without  requiring  such  large 
full-employment  surpluses  in  the  midst  of  vast  unemployment.  At  the  same 
time  it must  be  said that  full-employment  deficits of  the  order  of 
4,  5  or  6%  are  not  sustainable.  In  a  world  with  positive  real  interest  rates 
they  imply  growing  real  debt  burdens  which  are  bound  to  lead to financial 
instability.  Ultimately tax  payers  would  not  be  willing to  consider  paying 
the  taxes  with  which  to  service  and  amortize  the  debt.  Capital  levies  or 
12  currency depreciation  would  be  the  way  out 
Once  we  accept  the  idea  that  moderate  full-employment  budget  deficits 
per  se  are  not  an  obstacle  to  a  cyclically expansionary fiscal  policy  we 
still have  to determine  whether  the  expansion  and  the  resulting deterioration 
in  the  budget  will  lead  tD  crowding  out.  It would  certainly represent  a 
very  poor  trade-off  if fiscal  expansion  and  the  resulting deficits  showed  no 
pay-off  in  terms  of  growth  because  they  led  to a  substantially matching 
decline  in  private  spending.  There  is  no  reason  to  fear  that  course  of  events. 
Crowding  out,  in  an  economy  where  output  can  expand  in  response  to demand, 
occurs  because  with  income  growth  money  demand  rises.  If the  money  supply 
11 
12 
The  inflation adjustment  for  Denmark  only  includes  the  depreciation 
in  the  real  value  of  the  domestic  debt.  No  adjustment  is  made  for  the 
external  debt, either because  of  inflation or,  for  the  part  denominated 
in  foreign  currency,  of  depreciation. 
See  J.M.  Keynes,  A Tract  on  Monetary  Reform,  Royal  Economic  Society, 
1977,  pp.  59-60. 
" •••  the  level  of  the  franc  is going  to  be  settled in  the  longrun  not 
by  speculation or  the  balance  of  trade,  or  even  the  outcome  of  the 
Ruhr  adventure,  but  by  the  proportion of  his  earned  income  which  the 
French  tax  payer  will  permit  to  be  taken  from  him  to  pay  the  claims 
of  the  French  rentier". -26-
fails to accommodate  the  expansion  in  nominal  income  higher  interest  rates 
dampen  the  increase  in  spending.  The  issue  then  is to  secure  the  right 
monetary-fiscal  policy mix.  Specifically,  in  a  context  of  nominal  income 
targeting,  the  nominal  income  target  must  Leave  room  for  real  expansion, 
given  the  prevailing  rate of  inflation.  Assume  an  expected·inflation  rate 
of  say  8.5%  and  a  0.5  income  elasticity of  money  demand.  To  Leave  room  for 
a  real  expansion  of  3%,  an  11.5%  nominal  target  implies  that  nominal  money 
would  have  to  grow  by  about  10%,  not  taking  into account  trend velocity 
movements.  The  right  monetary-fiscal  policy  mix  thus  solves  the  issue of 
crowding  out.  It also  implies  that  fiscal  expansion  will  not  run  into added 
deficit effects  through  increases  in  the  Level  of  interest  rates. 
Concerns  about  crowding  out  arise  in  yet  another  perspective.  It is 
argued  that  the  very fact  of deficits, through  expectations,  raises  real 
interest  rates  and  thus  reduces  private demand.  This  argument  is entirely 
correct  in  the  case of  permanent  (inflation corrected,  real)  deficits. 
A rise  in  the  real  full-employment  budget  deficit  would  raise  real  demand  at 
full-employment  and  that  inevitably  raises  real  interest  rates.  Given  this 
mechanism  a  permanent  worsening  of  the  budget  would  indeed  raise  long-term 
real  interest  rates,  almost  independently of  short  term  monetary  policy. 
For  this  reason  it is  important  to  focus  on  purely cyclical  fiscal  expansion, 
not  a  permanent  increase  in  the  budget  deficit.  In  this  manner  there  is no 
threat  of expectations-induced  increases  in  long  term  real  interest  rates. 
Which  Set  of  Fiscal  Measures  to  Adopt  ? 
Measures  which  expand  aggregate  demand  without  affecting aggregate 
supply  would,  after  some  reduction  in  unemployment,  run  into bottlenecks 
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  firms  to  supply  more,  both  because  of  Labor 
costs  and  a  largely antiquated capital  stock.  Thus  fiscal  measures  should 
be  directed at  investment,  increasing  investment  demand  in  the  short  run 
and  allowing  firms  to  accumulate  capital,  increase  productivity and  thus 
reduce  unit  labor  costs.  Specifically  we  suggest  a  transitory investment 
subsidy.  At  the  same  time  there  is  room  to  improve  directly slack  in  the 
labor  market  by  providing  subsidies or  tax  credits  on  the  increase,  above 
some  benchmark,  in  employment.  Such  a  measure  is all the  more  warranted 
in that  the  growth  of  non-wage  labor  costs  has  become  a  growing -27-
disincentive  to  employment.  The  problem  of  non-wage  Labor  costs  is  an 
important  issue  of  Long-run  fiscal  reform,  an  issue  on  which  we  do  not  touch 
here.  But  as  a  separate,  cyclical  policy  we  call  here  for  at  Least  temporary, 
marginal  employment  subsidies. 
We  believe that  a  temporary  set  of  investment  subsidies,  coupled 
with  some  reduction  in  non-wage  Labor  costs  on  extra employment,represents 
a  good  policy package.  By  being  temporary,  it  induces  firms  to start 
investment  projects earlier and  has  therefore  a  stronger effect  than  a 
permanent  credit.  By  being  temporary,  it  would  also  phase  itself out 
automatically,  rather  than  decrease  fiscal  revenues  forever.  The  reduction 
in  non-wage  Labor  costs  would  also  have  two  effects.  By  increasing the  cash 
flow  of  firms,  it would  actually make  some  of  the  financial  resources  needed 
for  investment  directly available  to  firms;  it might  decrease  the  growing 
number  of  bankruptcies.  Of  course,  on  the  supply  side, it would  reduce  Labor 
costs,  making  it easier to  accommodate  the  increase  in  demand. 
Our  recommendation  for  an  investment  subsidy  needs  amplification  in 
two  respects.  First,  in  many  countries  public  sector  investment  represents 
an  important  share  of  total  investment.  More  importantly,  budgetary 
stringency  has  cut  off  in  many  places  public  sector  investment  projects  that 
are  well  warranted on  cost-benefit  grounds.  We  would  therefore  believe that 
it is  important  to  expand,  in  these  areas,  public  sector  investment  along 
with  the  increase  in  private  investment  brought  about  by  the  subsidy. 
Second,  we  do  not  propose  investment  as  the  instrument  of  recovery  because 
in  that  manner  the  employment  problem  would  be  coped  with  most  effectively. 
That  certainly is  not  the  case  as  directly targeted public  works  would  in 
all  Likelihood  absorb  more  slack  in  the  Labor  market.  The  case  for  investment 
subsidies,  and  public  sector  investment,  is  to  favor  those  industries  which 
have  suffered particularly from  the  downturn  in demand,  but  which  have·  Long-
run  viability.  It is  thus  a  recommendation  grounded  in  supply-side  economics. 
In  making  the  case  for  expansionary fiscal  policy  we  have  assumed 
that  countries  are  willing  to  incur  increased deficits  in  the  recovery.  But 
it is  worth  adding  that  those  countries  who  find  it impossible  to  consider 
deficit  finance  can  still undertake  expansion  by  Looking  to  balanced budget 
policies.  Indeed it  is  even  possible  to  consider  cuts  in  government  transfer -28-
payments  matching  the  investment  subsidies  and  yet  obtain  some  stimulus. 
(Appendix  5  present  some  simple  computations  to this effect). 
We  return once  more  to  the  actual  or  perceived trade-off  between 
financial  stability and  recovery  brought  about  by  fiscal  expansion.  There 
is  no  question  that  even  proponents  of  real-wage-cut  therapy  recognize  that 
aggregate  demand  expansion  is a  necessary part  of  the  recovery.  To  resolve 
the  possible  conflict, if any,  between  budget  deficits and  financial 
stability we  have  made  quite explicitly a  recommendation  for  transitory 
policies.  Being  transitory they do  not  apply  to  countries  that  are  concerned 
with  reducing  the  size of  government  and  thus  favor  reductions  in  budget 
deficits. 
The  Need  for  Coordinated  Expansion 
An  essential  part  of  the fiscal  expansion  program  is that  it should 
be  an  EC-wide  coordinated expansion.  A coordinated expansion  provides  much 
more  expansionary potential  per  ECU  deficit, it  implies  smaller deficits 
and  smaller deterioration  in  the  external  balance  with  the  associated  risks 
of depreciation and  inflation.  The  attempt  of  France  to  expand  by  herself  in 
1981  showed  very dramatically that  the  individual  country,  upon  expanding, 
runs  rapidly  into external  deficits and  exchange  rate  pressure as  imports 
grow  relative to export  revenues.  This  is an  effective obstacle to fiscal 
expansion  and  is  rightly seen  as  such  by  fiscal  authorities  in  each  country. 
But  it is equally  important  to  recognize  that  these  risks  do  not 
attach to a  coordinated expansion.  In  a  coordinated expansion  increased 
imports  are  matched  by  increased export  revenues  due  to  partner  country 
expansion.  In  the  current  world  situation  leakages  to third countries,  which 
are  likely to occur,  will  also be  recovered to  the  extent  that  these  countries 
are  at  present  constrained in their  import  spending  by  the available export 
revenues.  They  would  assume  a  less  restrictive policy stance  in  response  to 
an  EC  expansion.  In  sum,  a  coordinated expansion  is  a  vastly more  effective, 
less  risky venture  and  for  that  reason  must  be  insisted on. 
Simulations  in  Table  8  show  clearly the difference  between  isolated 
and  coordinated fiscal  action.  Coordinated fiscal  action  shows  nearly twice -29-
the  growth  impact  that  isolated expansion  achieves.  It also  shows  very 
much  smaller  budget  deficits. 
Table  8  An  Increase of  Public  Investment  of  1%  of  GOP  After  Two  Years 
Effects  on 
Individual  Action 
GOP  Growth 
Trade  Balance/GOP 
Budget  Deficit/GOP 
Coordinated  Expansion 
GOP  Growth 
Trade  Balance/GOP 
Budget  Deficit/GOP 


























While  the  case  for  coo~dinated fiscal  expansion  is  compelling, 
individual  countries  have  not  seen  their  interests  in  that  direction.  On  the 
contrary they  have  been  waiting for  other  countries  to expand,  specifically 
the u.s.,  seeking  recovery  through  increased net  exports.  There  has  thus  been 
a  waiting  game  underway,  even  as  the  world  economy  has  been  slipping and 
the  recovery  of  1982  failed to  materialize.  It  is  time  now  to shift attention 
forcefully  to  the  interests that  all  countries  share  in  the  world  economy 
and  to call  for  coordinated,  cooperative  strategies. These  will, perforce, 
be  differentiated across  countries  with  the  hard  currency  countries  taking 
a  relatively major  and  early initiative and  the  countries  with  more  acute 
budget  and/or  current  account  deficit  problems  Looking  to  more  moderate 
expansion  programs.  But  subject  to  that  qualification,agreement  should  be 
reached  on  a  joint program  of  expansion,  to  be  taking place  with  urgency. 
Designing  a  program  of differentiated  ~yet  coordinated expansion 
may  be  difficult  to  agree  on.  Yet  there  is a  simple  principle that  might 
help  set  a  benchmark  for  minimum  expansion.  Suppose  only one  group  of -30-
countries  in  the  EEC  expands,  while  the others  do  not  take any  fiscal 
initiative.  The  expanding  group  would  incur  budget  and  current  account 
deterioration,  but  the  non-expanding  group  would  have  improved  budget  and 
external  balances.  A natural  benchmark  for  minimum  expansion  might  then  be 
oriented toward  a  fiscal  expansion  that  ensures,  in  weak  currency 
countries,  a  zero  change  in  the  budget  or  a  zero  change  in  the  current 
balance.  In this  manner  the  weak  countries  neither  serve  as  locomotives 
of  expansion,  nor  are  they a  drag  on  the  expansion. 
The  coordination problem  goes  beyond  the  EC.  There  is also need 
for  the  EC  to  agree  with  the  U.S.  and  with  Japan  on  expansion  in  the  world 
economy.  Much  of  the  pressure  here  should  be  on  the  U.S.  to  ensure  a  further 
decline  in  real  interest  rates  and  on  Japan  to  allow  both  further  appreciation 
and  fiscal  expansion.  Coordination at  the  world  level  is  in  Europe's  narrow 
interest--especially  as  regards  further  lowering  of  real  interest 
rates--but  it is also a  responsibility of  industrial  countries  at  a  time 
when  high  real  interest  rates  and  low  real  prices of  commodities  and 
reduced  manufactures  exports  have  led  to  a  major  collapse  in  third world 
countries.  Growth  in  the  world  economy  in this  perspective  is essential 
to  restore stability in  world  financial  markets. -31-
APPENDIX  1  PRODUCTION  FUNCTIONS 
Work  by  Berndt-Wood  for  the  U.S.  (among  others>,  Dramais  and 
Dicks-Mireaux  for  Europe  using  cost  functions  has  shed  some  light  on  the 
shape  of  the  technology.  We  present  the  estimated elastiticites of 
substitution  (Allen  elasticities)  from  these  studies. 
They  are  only  meant  to  be  suggestive  and  to  support  the  claim 
made  in  the  text  that  the  assumption  t~at gross  output  is 
Cobb-Douglas  in  materials  (or  intermediate  inputs),  capitaL  and  Labor 
(OKL  = "KM  =CSML  = 1)is not  in  gross  contradiction  with  the  econometric 
evidence.  (This  neglects  energy,  which  has  a  relatively small  share  of 
gross  output). -32-
U.S.  France  U.K.  U.K. 
(Berndt-Wood)  (Dramais) 
Germany 
(Dramais)  (Dramais)  (Dicks-Mireaux) 
Elasticities 
°KK  -8.8  -6.6  -3.9 
0LL  -1.5  -3.5  -3.2 
0 MM  --.3  -.5  -.5 
°KL  1.0  1.2  .8 
°KM  .6  .9  .5 
0 LM  .6  1.0  1.0 
(  0 EE  -.10  -3.9  -34.0 
0 LE  .6  -.4  -.5 
°KE  -3.0  -2.6  -4.0 
0 ME  )  .8  .5  1.7 
Shares 
SK  .05  .11**  .11** 
SL  .25  .22**  .22** 
SM  .66  .63**  .64** 
SE  .04  .o2**  .o  2** 
* 
** 
Constrained to  be  unity  in estimation. 
Intercepts of  share equations,  not  mean  shares. 
Sources 
-6.4  -6.8 
-3.4  -2.5 
-.5  -.7 
1.0  *  .6 
1.0  *  .9 
1.0  1.1 
-3.3 
1.0  * 
-7.0 
1.0  * 
.11**  .11 
.22**  .29 
.64**  .60 
.o  2** 
Berndt  and  Wood  :  "Technology,  Prices  and  the  Derived  Demand  for  Energy", 
REStat,  August  1975,  259-268, 
using an  unrestricted cost  function  in  K,  L,  E,  M. 
Dramais  :  "Trans-Log  KLEM  Model  for  France,  Germany,  Italy and  the  U.K.", 
Working  Paper  41,  mimeo  DULBEA,  1980, 
using  an  unrestricted cost  function  in  K,  L,  E,  M. 
Dicks-Mireaux  :  Thesis -in  progress,  Harvard, 
using  an  unrestricted cost  function  in  K,  L,  M. -33-
*  APPENDIX  2  A NOTE  ON  THE  REAL  WAGE  GAP 
The  problem 
1.  Suppose  you  know  the  labour  demand  function, and  employment  (E) 
depends  on  the  real  product  wage  (w),  real  import  prices  (~), capital  (K) 
and  time  (t)  1•  Then,  if you  know  what  full  employment  <E*>  is, you  know 
what  the  real  wage  gap  is. It is  (w-w*>  where 
E* =  f<w*,  ~  K  t)  ,.,  , 
and 
E = f(w,  n,K,  t). 
Computing  the  wage  gap  does  not  help to explain  low  employment  but  it 
tells us  how  much  wages  have  to fall. 
2.  If  you  do  not  know  the  demand  function,  then  you  cannot  calculate 
the  wage  gap,  or  do  any  informative  calculation.  For  illustration assume 
separability of  imports,  since  this  is  always  assumed  in  the  calculations. 
Then  the  labour  demand  function  is 
E =  g(~,  K,  t) 
where  w is  the  wage  relative  to  the  GOP  deflator.  If this  comes  from  a 
CES  value-added function 
in  competitive  conditions 
* Prepared  by  R.  Layard. 
1  See  J.  Symons  "Relative Prices  and  the  Demand  for  Labor  in 
British Manufacturing", unpublished  Manuscript,  London  School  of 
Economics,  1982. -34-
If the  real  wage  is  too  high,in  the  medium  term  the  share of  wages  will  rise 
if  p > 0,  i.e. if the elasticity of  substitution (1/1+p)  < 1.  It will fall 
if the elasticity of  substitution  is  high.  Unless  we  know  these  parameters 
we  cannot  infer anything  from  what  we  see  happening  to  the  share of  wages. 
3.  However,out  of  interest  we  have  computed  the  share  of  wages,taking 
the  national  accounts  shares  of  employees,  and  adjusting them  by 
(i)  multiplying  by  (Employees  + Self-employed)/Employees 
(ii) •ultiplying by  (V/L)/(V/L)  where  V/L  is trend productivity 
2  computed  in  Grubb,  Layard  and  Symons,p.S  (footnote) 
Results 
The  Table  shows  the  following  index * 
As  the  Table  shows,there  has  been  a  rise  in  the  index  since  1973  in  most 
EEC  countries,  but  not  in  the  U.S.  or  Canada. 
The  preceding approach  is preferable to that  based on  wage  indexes 
for  the  following  reasons. 
(i)  There  is  consistency  in  the  data  set  used  to  measure  output 
and  remuneration. 
(ii)  Issues  such  as  Labour  taxes  are  handled  automatically. 
(iii) Problems  of  restricted coverage  of  wage  data  are  avoided. 
For  the  record,  even  using  wage  data  there  is never  any  need  to  use 
data  on  import  prices  and  final  output  prices  if the  separability assumption 
is used,  as  it invariably is. 
2  See  "Wages,  Unemployment  and  Incomes  Policy",  unpublished  manuscript, 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX  3  ON  COMPUTING  THE  "CORRECT"  REAL  WAGE 
Let  q, 1.,  k,  m be  percentage  changes  in  gross  output,  Labor,  capital 
and  intermediate  inputs.  Let  w,  r, n  be  percentage  changes  in  the  rental 
prices -- in  terms  of  the  price of  gross  output -- of  Labor,  capital  and 
materials.  Then  : 
A1  q  =.at  + B  I.  +a kk  +a  m 
R.  m 
A2  m + n  =  q 
A3  R.  +  w =  q 
A4  k +  r  =  q 
The  first  equation  is the  production  function,  with  shares Bfl' ak, 
om'  rate of  factor  productivity growtha.  The  next  three equations  are first 
order  conditions  for  profit  maximization.  If  k  is quasi-fixed,  the  Last 
equation  determines  the  percentage  change  in  the  shadow  rental  price. 
To  solve  for  the  real  wage  growth  consistent  with  a  given  growth  of 
employment{, we  solve  for  q,  m and  w given  k, nand  1..  Replacing  (A2) 
in  (A1)  and  rearranging 
Replacing  in  (A3) 
*  *  w  = q  - R. 
To  solve  for  the  growth  of  employment  consistent  with  a  given  growth 
of  the  real  wage,  of  the  price of  materials  and  of  capital,  we  solve for 
q,R.,  m given  k,w  and  n.  Replacing  (A2)  and  (A3)  in  (A1)  and  rearranging 
-1  - q =  ak  (  B t  - a  1. w - am tt)  +  k Replacing  in  CA3) 
(1972  = 100) 




Product  Wage 
Product  Price of  Materials 



































APPENDIX  4  MONEY  RULES 
Consider  the  quantity equation  in  logarithms 
(1)  m + v =  p  +  y 
Assume  further  that 
V  =  ai + ey  +  E 
Y =  -ei  +  F;: 
p  = 'YY  + ll 
e:,  F;:,  T'J  are  the  autonomous  components  of  velocity,  spending  and  inflation 
respectively. 
Then  under  a  constant  money  rule,  m =  0  say, 
y  =  (a+e (1-t')' -B >  >  -
1 
Caf;:+t-n > 
Under  a  constant  nominal  income  rule  m =  -v, 
-1 
y  =  -(1+-y)  11 
Thus  a  constant  nominal  rule  dominates  a  constant  money  rule  for F;:  and  e: 
disturbances.  Whether  it dominates  in  the  face  of n  disturbances  is 
ambiguous.  Furthermore  the  analysis  assumes  a  given  full-employment 
output  level. -39-
APPENDIX  5  THE  IMPACT  OF  AN  INVESTMENT  SUBSIDY 
be 
Let  q  be  the  present  value  of  marginal  profits and  let  "adjusted q" 
-1 
q  = (1-k-l';z)  q 
A 
where  k  is  the  rate  of  investment  tax  credit,  ~  the  corporate profit 
tax.  rate and  z  the  present  value  of  depreciation  deductions. 
According  to  the  q  theory,  investment  is  then  a  function  of  qA. 
Let  a  be  the elasticity of  investment  with  respect  to  qA. 
A temporary  investment  tax  credit  has  little effect  on  q.  If  we 
assume  q  to  be  constant,  we  get  : 
di/I = adk/ (1-k-~z). 
Estimates  of  a  vary  between  .5  and  1.  ~  is approximately  .5, z  varies 
between  .6 and  1, depending  on  type  of  good  and  country.  This  implies 
that  in  response  to  an  increase  in  k from  .1  to  .3 for  example,  the 
percentage  change  in  investment  is  between  8X  and  2SX. 
Thus  the direct  change  in  total  spending,  if  investment  tax  credits 
are  matched  by  reductions  in  government  spending,  per  dollar of  investment 
tax  credit  is given  by  : 
(di-Idk)/Idk = (di/I)/dk - 1 
It varies  between  -.2  in  the  worst  case  (a = .5, z = .6)  and  2.5 
in  the  best  case  <a=  1, z  = 1  >.  This  clearly does  not  take  into account 
further  multiplier effects. 
A more  elaborate  treatment  is  given  in  Abel,  "An  Assessment  of  Tax 
Credits  and  Tax  Cuts",  New  England  Economic  Review,  November/December  78, 
54-66. -40-
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